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THE NINTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTING AN
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
SUZANNA SHERRY*

As the recent Symposium in these pages indicated, the preliminary
debate over the meaning of the ninth amendment is essentially over. Despite the diversity of views expressed in the Symposium, all but one contributor agreed that the ninth amendment does protect judicially
enforceable unenumerated rights. The real question now must be how to
identify those rights.
Only Professor Michael McConnell disputes the conclusion that the
ninth amendment allows judges to enforce unenumerated rights. He suggests that neither the history of the Constitution nor sound political theory supports such a reading of the ninth amendment.' Using his article
as a focus for this Essay, I would like to do two things: (1) to add to the
historical work demonstrating the framers' commitment to judicially enforceable unenumerated rights; (2) to comment generally on the New
Right insistence on strict textual limits to judicial activism, which I believe stems from a mistaken view of the judicial process.
I.
As Sanford Levinson points out, 2 the fascination with the ninth
amendment began largely as a reaction to the New Right insistence that
constitutional interpretation can legitimately rest only on the specific
written text and its history-a sharp change from the traditional practices of, and canonical commentary on, the Supreme Court. Until
"originalism" became the vogue, there was no need to delve into the forgotten amendment or its history in order to support "non-originalist"
review. This reactive foray into the origins of the ninth amendmentand to an even greater extent, into the eighteenth century idea of
unenumerated rights generally-has rewarded historically-minded nonoriginalists beyond their wildest dreams. And, to the surprise of no one,
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1976, Middlebury College; J.D. 1979,
University of Chicago. I would like to thank Daniel A. Farber for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Essay.
1. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
89 (1988).
2. Levinson, ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131,
134-39 (1988).
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the New Right is now at great pains to refute the essentially irrefutable
historical conclusion that those who wrote, ratified, and initially interpreted American constitutions believed that judges should enforce not
only rights specifically enumerated in those written constitutions, but
also unenumerated natural rights.
The standard New Right historical argument comes in many guises,
but all reduce to the essential contention that the retained rights referred
to in the ninth amendment are either redundant or judicially unenforceable. Lawrence Sager persuasively refutes the notion that the ninth
amendment is redundant. 3 I will focus on the alternative thesis: that the
ninth amendment does refer to additional rights, but that they are not
judicially enforceable. New Right theorists sometimes suggest, as Professor McConnell does, that such rights are unenforceable because they are
merely aspirational, and sometimes that they are unenforceable because
they are political rather than legal. 4 Both of these arguments are historically untenable.
The evidence in favor of attributing to the men who wrote and ratified the United States Constitution a belief in judicially enforceable natu5
ral rights is well-rehearsed in several contributions to the Symposium.
Virtually the only evidence to the contrary is a few scattered statements
in the Federal Convention, in support of a Council of Revision, that
judges might not otherwise be able to strike down unjust laws. 6 Two
additional arguments are relevant.
First, Professor McConnell's suggestion requires us to view the
framers as virtually dirnwitted. As McConnell recognizes, the framers
viewed their new written Constitution as a form of law. As he also apparently recognizes, they followed Coke in endorsing the idea of judicial
review: judges should enforce the law, including the Constitution. Finally, he does not dispute that the framers believed in something that
they themselves denominated the law of nature, but he urges us to find
that they did not believe that law to be enforceable. He thus requires us
to believe that the framers drew a distinction between one kind of law
and another: the written Constitution was legal and enforceable, but natural law was neither.
3. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on
Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 (1988).
4. Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (1988); Sager, supra note 3.
5. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211 (1988); Sager,
supra note 3; see also Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
6. Professor McConnell quotes these scattered references and labels them "'substantial evidence against" the unwritten rights position. McConnell, supra note 1, at 94 n.32.
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These men were, by and large, lawyers, and they were careful with
language and with ideas. For them to speak of the written, judicially
enforceable Constitution and unwritten natural law in the same breathas they so frequently did-without distinguishing between the two,
strongly suggests that they thought of unwritten rights as analogous to
the written Constitution: legal rights, enforceable through the mechanism of judicial review. To attribute to them any other conclusion
strains credulity.
There is also even more significant evidence that the founding generation recognized judicially enforceable unenumerated rights. For the
first thirty or forty years after the Constitution took effect, judges did
enforce unenumerated rights. At both the state and federal level, courts
consistently invalidated statutes that conflicted with unwritten rights.
Sometimes they also cited provisions of the written constitution, sometimes they did not. Sometimes there were no written provisions that
could even arguably apply.
The early Supreme Court's role in endorsing unwritten natural law
is well known. But that Court was not unique, nor is it even the most
illustrative example. In state after state, judges invalidated retroactive
laws, uncompensated takings, and other interferences with the natural
rights of citizens. Some of these states had no written bill of rights at all;
others had written constitutions that lacked ex post facto or takings
clauses. Nevertheless, judges used unwritten law to invalidate legislative
actions. A review of constitutional opinions in four states provides sig7
nificant evidence of the prevailing view of enforceable unwritten rights.
Virginia affords the best illustration of the use of unwritten law. Despite the existence of an extensive written bill of rights, Virginia judges
relied on unwritten law as well. Moreover, Virginia's well-developed
court system, its long-established tradition of reporting decisions, and its
outstanding jurists make it an ideal representative state for studying constitutional decisionmaking in the early nineteenth century. Outstanding
Virginia judges and lawyers-men such as John Marshall, Edmund Pendleton, Edmund Randolph, George Wythe, Spencer Roane and St.
George Tucker-were influential in the overall development of American
7. The following discussion is a brief summary of my ongoing research into early (1788-1830)
state constitutional decisions in four states: Virginia, Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina.
Those states were chosen in order to examine both Northern and Southern states, and states both
with and without a written bill of rights. One portion of that research, focusing exclusively on Virginia, is forthcoming as S. Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual Interpretation, in
Toward a Usable Past: An Examination of the Origins and Implications of State Protections of
Liberty (P. Finkelman & S. Gottlieb eds., University of Georgia Press 1990).
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constitutional law.8
It is thus enlightening to find that Virginia judges not only enforced
unwritten rights, but they also forthrightly declared their obligation to
do so. In the 1809 case of Currie's Administrators v. Mutual.Assurance
Society,9 counsel for the insurance company had defended a retrospective
statute by arguing that the Virginia Constitution of 1776 did not prohibit
retrospective statutes:
a
No doubt every government ought to keep in view the great principles
of justice and moral right, but no authority is expressly given to the
judiciary by the Constitution of Virginia, to declare a law void as being
morally wrong or in violation of a contract. 10
Judge Spencer Roane vehemently rejected that textualist assumption.
After noting that the legislature's authority was limited by "considerations of justice" as well as by the written constitution, he continued:
It was argued by a respectable member of the bar, that the legislature
had a right to pass any law, however just, or unjust, reasonable, or
unreasonable. This is a position which even the courtly Judge Blackstone was scarcely hardy enough to contend for, under the doctrine of
the boasted omnipotence of parliament. What is this, but to lay prostrate, at the footstool of the legislature, all our rights of person and of
property, and abandon those great objects, for the protection of which,
alone, all free governments have been instituted?1
In other Virginia cases between 1788 and 1828, judges also relied on such
unwritten fundamental law as "principles of natural justice,"1 2 and "Natural Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Law of every civilized
country."13

Judges in Massachusetts-another state with an extensive written
bill of rights-also recognized their obligation to measure laws against
both the written constitution and unwritten law. In Foster v. Essex
Bank 14 in 1819, Chief Judge Parker of the Supreme Judicial Court indulged in a long dissertation on the nature of fundamental law. He began by noting that laws that "manifestly infringe some of the provisions
of the constitution, or violate the rights of the subject," should be invalidated by the judiciary.1 5 As an example of the first type of invalid stat8. They were also among the best-educated: the College of William and Mary established, in
1779, the first American chair in law.
9. 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315 (1809).
10. Id. at 341.
11. Id. at 346-47.
12. Elliott's Ex'r v. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) 268, 283, 285 (1802); Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. (I
Call) 555, 556 (1799).
13. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 265 (1828).
14. 16 Mass. 244 (1819).
15. Id. at 269.
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ute, he cited a hypothetical legislative declaration that a citizen was
guilty of treason; that statute would be in violation of article XXV of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. As an example of the second type
of invalid statute, he cited a hypothetical law that would "destroy or
impair the legal force of contracts." Such a statute, he noted "would be
unconstitutional, although not expressly prohibited; because, by the fundamental principles of legislation, the law or rule must operate prospec16
tively only.'
The Massachusetts court also invalidated laws on the basis of unwritten fundamental principles. In 1799, the Supreme Judicial Court
considered the validity of the same Georgia statute eventually overturned
by the United States Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Peck. 17 The Massachusetts court held the statute to be "a mere nullity-a flagrant, outrageous violation of the first and fundamental principles of social
compacts," and then added as an afterthought that it was "moreover
declared void, because it was considered directly repugnant to" the contract clause of the federal Constitution.' 8 Similarly, in 1814, a Massachusetts court invalidated a statute purporting to extend the statute of
limitations in a particular case only, noting that the statute was "manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice,
and to the spirit of our constitution and laws."' 19
Unlike Virginia and Massachusetts, New York lacked a written bill
of rights until 1821. Nevertheless, rights were not left unprotected in
that state. The most significant unwritten right was the right to just
compensation for the public taking of private property. Despite the absence of any written takings clause in the New York Constitution of
1777, a series of cases beginning in 1816 relied on natural justice to require compensation when private land was taken. In 1816, Chancellor
Kent held that depriving an owner of property without compensation
'20
would be "unjust, and contrary to the first principles of government."
Similarly, in 1822, Justice Spencer found an uncompensated taking to be
"against natural right and justice."' 2 1 Although he pointed to takings
clauses in both the United States Constitution and the not-yet-effective
16. Id. at 270-71. Judge Parker never mentioned the contract clause of the United States Constitution, and apparently believed that his hypothetical statute would not violate it, since he noted
that the statute was "not expressly prohibited."
17. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
18. Derby v. Blake (1799), described at 226 Mass. 618, 624 (1917).
19. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 403 (1814).
20. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 168 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
21. Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822), ret'd on other grounds, 20
Johns. 735 (N.Y. 1823).
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1821 New York Constitution, he noted that neither applied to the particular taking at issue-but he deemed both clauses "declaratory of a great
and fundamental principle of government, ' 22 and ordered the payment
of compensation.
By 1827, a compensation requirement was included in New York's
written constitution, but the New York court nevertheless tested a challenged ordinance against both the written constitution and the unwritten
"fundamental principle of civilized society, that private property shall
not be taken ...without just compensation. ' 23 And, as late as 1834, a
New York court could write that taking for a private rather than a public
purpose was "in violation of natural right, and if it is not in violation of
the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be
supported."

'24

In South Carolina, the most interesting example of the enforceability of unwritten law is Judge Burke's opinion in Zyistra v. Corporationof
Charleston,25 a 1794 case involving a fine imposed without a jury trial.
Although the written constitution did guarantee a trial by jury, the City
of Charleston had argued that the city Board of Wardens could impose
fines without a jury because they had been doing so before the written
constitution was adopted, and thus were implicitly exempted from the
constitutional provision. Judge Burke declared this argument beside the
point, in language striking for its affirmation of unwritten rights:
But the trial by jury is a common law right; not the creature of the
constitution, but originating in time immemorial; it is the inheritance
of every individual citizen, the title to26 which commenced long before
the political existence of this society.
Other South Carolina cases also repeatedly referred to such unwritten
sources of law as the "fundamental principles of society,"' 27 "justice, and
the dictates of moral reason,"' 28 and "immutable principles of justice and
'29
common law."
These state cases confirm that the early United States Supreme
Court was not alone in its vision of enforceable natural rights. Judges
and lawyers throughout the new nation shared a common belief that
both written and unwritten rights should be enforced by courts. The
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Coates v. The Mayor, 7 Cow. 585, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
In re Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382 (1794).
Id. at 395.
Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 56 (1796).
Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 98 (S.C. Super. Ct. 1789).
Dunn v. City Council, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 189, 199-200 (1824).
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ninth amendment is itself merely further evidence of this belief; even
without it, we would be forced to conclude that the founding generation
intended judges to enforce rights beyond those enumerated in the written
Constitution.30
I!.

Professor McConnell also raises another question about judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights. Ignoring the constitutional' framework envisioned by the framers, he asks whether we now want a
constitutional framework that allows for open-ended judicial review.
Andrzej Rapaczynski persuasively suggests that this question is ultimately futile: the search for foundationalism, for rules that truly con32
strain judges, is bound to fail. 31 Indeed, as Sotirios Barber suggests,
McConnell himself appears to criticize only some results of judicial flexibility and to endorse others. It is, as always, a question of whose ox is
being gored. Even if it were possible, however, McConnell's search for
foundational--especially majoritarian--constraints is misguided.
Professor McConnell does not confine his criticism to the admittedly extreme "anti-constitutionalist" position he attributes to Barber.
Most of us would agree-the clear contrary intent of the framers
notwithstanding-that "courts are bound by the substantive principles of
the Constitution. ' 33 But McConnell goes further: he would severely
limit the methods by which judges may interpret that Constitution.
He defines standard interpretivism-which he apparently endorses-as the view that "judges must look to the text, structure, history,
and purposes of the Constitution" in order to determine its meaning. 34
Conspicuously absent from this otherwise unexceptionable list is any appeal to justice or moral reasoning. In fact, Professor McConnell explicitly rejects what he derisively calls the "ratiocination of the judge" as a
source of constitutional interpretation. 35 He also notes that the Constitution's "appeal" derives from its congruence with natural right, but that
30. Cf Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1043 (1988) (suggesting the existence of an unenumerated right to amend the Constitution
by referendum despite the apparently limiting provisions of article V). It is still significant that, as
Chief Justice Marshall noted in an analogous context, the Constitution "has not left [the logical
conclusion] to general reasoning." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819).
31. See Rapaczynski, supra note 4, at 190-98; see also M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
32. Barber, Whither Moral Realism in Constitutional Theory? A Reply to Professor McConnell,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111, 112-15 (1988).
33. McConnell, supra note 1, at 97.
34. Id. at 92.
35. Id. at 95.
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its authoritativeness comes from its popular ratification. He thus rules
out moral truth as either an explanation of the Constitution's legitimacy
or a method of illuminating its meaning. Notwithstanding his disclaimer
that he is a moral realist, this attempt to limit interpretation is an attempt to elevate consent over truth, and to privilege will at the expense of
reason.
Paul Kahn has noted that we share with the framers a basic conflict
about what makes an exercise of power (including the commands of a
constitution) legitimate. 36 Is a constitution legitimate because we have
consented to it (will), or is it legitimate because, and to the extent that, it
establishes a moral and just regime (reason)? A non-originalist, who
would add justice to the list of things a judge may consult in interpreting
the Constitution, would answer that a truly legitimate constitution requires both.
Professor McConnell, however, unequivocally casts his lot with
pure will: only the Constitution's popular origins make it legitimate. His
commitment to majority will is indeed so overwhelming that he also
urges judges to ignore the text and history when those sources direct
judges toward moral questions, as the ninth amendment clearly does.
Once again, this is both inconsistent with the framers' own inclinations
and politically unwise. Even Thomas Jefferson, no friend of activist judicial review, noted that "though the will of the majority is in all cases to
'37
prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable."
Professor McConnell's theoretical choice of will over reason has
clear practical consequences. If the Constitution is legitimate only because we have consented to it, then the only question judges may ask in
interpreting it is what we have consented to. That conclusion, in turn,
supports McConnell's restrictive definition of valid interpretive strategies, which focus exclusively on the text and its history.
Professor McConnell's attempt to defend the morality of the Constitution-to reconcile reason and will-fails in two distinct ways. 38 His
36. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of the American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449
(1989).
37. First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 321, 322 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944).
38. This is not to suggest that reconciliation is impossible. Kahn suggests one version of reconciliation, whereby "[a] popularly legitimated text lends its legitimacy to a science of politics." Kahn,
supra note 36, at 483. Others have suggested another version: natural law gradually merged into
what might be called "natural-law-infused-textualism". See, e.g., G. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION 74-94 (1986); Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51 (1986);
Snowiss, From Fundamental Law to Supreme Law of the Land A Reinterpretation of the Origin of
Judicial Review, in 2 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVEVELOPMENT 1 (1987); cf Rapaczyn-
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preliminary argument is essentially just a defense of particular results: he
notes that "[t]he most fundamental and important rights are protected
either explicitly or by implication under traditional constitutional interpretive methods,"' 39 and that his definition of the majoritarian regime established by the Constitution is in fact also the best regime, or at least
"pretty good, and probably better than whatever a twentieth-century
judge might come up with." 4 He is simply restating an obvious but trivial point: his own vision of natural justice accords with the results
reached by interpreting the Constitution through "traditional" methods.
But what of a judge who finds the "traditional" result 4 ' inconsistent with
her carefully considered view of natural right? According to Professor
McConnell, she is nevertheless precluded from entertaining moral considerations. That McConnell thinks his method of interpretation yields
just results-in other words, that we have consented to what is, for him,
a substantively just document-is not necessarily a reconciliation of reason and will for anyone else.
Professor McConnell's primary mode of reconciling reason and will
is more subtle. He contends, in essence, that legislative moral choices are
likely to be both substantively better and more productive of public
moral discourse-and thus of public moral development-than judicial
moral choices. I happen to disagree, for reasons that I will return to at
the end of this Essay.
But the more significant response is to point to McConnell's concession that judges may override legislative choices when their (legitimate)
interpretation of the Constitution requires them to do so. Our only quarrel is thus over what they may look at to determine whether a countermajoritarian remedy is appropriate in a given case. He wants them to
look to the Constitution. I want them to look to the Constitution and to
justice.
Professor McConnell thus wishes to limit judicial review by means
of interpretive devices that force judges to ignore reason and to focus
ski, supra note 4, at 188-90 (describing theories attributing similar reconciliative meaning to ninth
amendment).
39. McConnell, supra note 1, at 107.
40. Id.
41. Talking about "the" result of traditional interpretive methods, of course, is counter-factual.
See infra at 1011-13. As Part I suggests, examining the "text, structure, history and purposes" of the
ninth amendment demonstrates that the "traditional" method gives no guidance at all on difficult
questions: it tells us we're on our own. Professor Rapaczynski similarly shows that any interpretive
method can yield disparate results.
Professor McConnell, however, apparently believes that some cases are clearly indefensible using "traditional" interpretive methods, and I am therefore assuming arguendo that "traditional"
methods of interpretation can sometimes point in a single direction.
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exclusively on majority will as reflected in the written document. He
fears that unconstrained judicial review will merely "substitut[e] the
judge's understanding of natural rights for the Constitution's. '4 2 Moreover, his strained reading of the ninth amendment suggests that he believes that any portion of the Constitution that itself directs judges to
deliberate about justice is to be ignored.
This search for interpretive devices that eliminate judicial discretion
is, at bottom, profoundly positivist and profoundly relativist. It treats
the written Constitution as an absolute sovereign by excluding any examination of the moral dimensions of its language. Such a view is positivist
in the sense that "it makes no difference ...

if the sovereign command is

''4 3 It is
nothing but arbitrary will: order still requires capitulating to it.
relativist in that it denies the availability of any higher truth than what a
particular society has already chosen to embody in its written fundamental law. 44
An appeal to the finality and exclusivity of the historical Constitution is also, like most positivist and relativist arguments, morally and
politically dispiriting. It tells us that we as a society are not good enough
to make our own moral decisions: we must instead adhere slavishly to
the product of the better minds that went before. What Robin West has
called the "authoritarian impulse" is a symptom of despair:
We turn to [the authoritative text] to tell us how to live, because we
have abandoned the project of our own moral self-governance.... We
crave obedience when we have despaired of our45own moral compe-

tence, and hence self-governing moral authority.

A passively textualist approach to the Constitution is itself productive of
despair: when we cede the community's moral authority to an external
source, we give up a part of our humanity.
The desire to appeal to the absolute authority of the historical Constitution is also self-replicating, To the extent that we as a society relieve
ourselves of the obligation to make difficult moral decisions, we further
undermine our capacity to do so. Moral sensibilities, whether of an indi46
vidual or of a community, are best developed by making moral choices.
42. McConnell, supra note 1, at 101.
43. D. Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent 201 (forthcoming).
44. See Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 CHI.-KENT

L. REV. 67 (1988); Barber, supra note 32; Hirshman, Bront, Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the
Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 187-88 (1988).
45. West, The AuthoritarianImpulse in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 538
(1988); see also Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496-97 (1988).
46. See, e.g., Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293, 301 (1988); S.Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 Tulane L. Rev. (forthcoming 1989). The founding generation apparently agreed.
See Kahn, supra note 36, at 467.
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Let me anticipate Professor McConnell's probable response to this
line of argument. He would contend, I suspect, that giving moral authority to unelected judges is an even more authoritarian solution. He
would be wrong, for several reasons.
First, neither he nor any other New Right theorist denies that
unelected judges should have some obligation to oversee the community's moral choices. The mere existence of judicial review is not itself
controversial. Once we have ceded some moral responsibility to an
unelected body, the only question is how they should exercise that responsibility. To tell judges that they must engage in "value-free" judging-to confine them to the unsupplemented text--diminishes the very
definition of moral choice by curtailing the sources of moral authority.
Moreover, once we recognize that the legislature should not always prevail, we must delegate final moral authority somewhere: should we entrust it to judges who can reason about both morality and consent, or to
an ancient document simply because it reflects our erstwhile will? Federal judges, however unrepresentative, are a part of the community in a
way in which dead founders and parchment under glass cannot be.
Most important, judges are both of the community and outside it.
Their values are shaped by the community, but they are less susceptible
to the distorting influence of politics. Moral reasoning is deliberative.
To the extent that judges are better able than legislatures to engage in
reasoned deliberation, they will both produce better results and provide
an example and a catalyst for popular moral deliberation. 4 7 And when
their reasoning--or their decision-is inferior to the legislature's, it will
not prevail for long. Judges are replaced, constitutional amendments are
ratified, and judges rethink their positions-at least partly in response to
moral dialogue.
Finally, to return to where we began, judges engage in moral reasoning whether or not they purport to be merely interpreting the written
Constitution. Admonishing the judiciary to confine itself to interpretation of the majority's past will is a sham. Chief Justice Taney, whom
Professor McConnell so castigates for imposing his own values on an
unwilling community, explicitly based his decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford4 8 on a careful (and probably accurate 49) interpretation of the history
and text of the United States Constitution.
Arguing about the validity of interpretive strategies merely diverts
47. See Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986).
48. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
49. See W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA,
1760-1848, at 62-83 (1977).
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attention from the more important substantive question: did the Court
read the Constitution in a morally justifiable way? A reinvigoration of
the ninth amendment would force judges and their critics to argue about
that question, and "an angry quarrel over right and wrong is superior to
'5 0
the silence of relativism."
Since the search for absolute constraints on judges-and the consequent rejection of open-ended judicial review-is historically inaccurate,
politically misguided and intellectually unintelligible, why do some
thoughtful scholars continue to insist on it? I would suggest that their
insistence might stem from either of two sources. A few of those opposed
to reinvigorating the ninth amendment are simply political strategists
who wish "to curb civil liberties and restrict remedies for governmental
wrongs by any available means." 5 1 More serious scholars, however, including Professor McConnell, are obviously truly troubled by what they
perceive as an unaccountable and irresponsible judiciary: "Power without responsibility is not a happy combination. '5 2 This fear of a tyrannical judiciary stems, I believe, from a mistaken understanding of the
judicial process, and especially of the art of interpretation.
Professor McConnell appears to believe that there is an inherent
meaning in the Constitution: as he says of the ninth amendment, it
"means precisely what it says."5' 3 He speaks of "the substantive principles of natural justice reflected in the Constitution" and "the political
theory of the Constitution. ' 54 It is by now commonplace-but nonetheless accurate-to observe that meaning does not inhere in documents,
but is created by an interaction between a document and its readers.
This is not to say that a document has unlimited meanings; the language
as well as the context make some meanings unimaginable and others implausible. The reader's own sensibilities necessarily influence which
meanings she finds unimaginable and which she finds most plausible.
McConnell fails to recognize either the inevitability of ambiguities of
meaning or the inescapable role of the reader in supplying part of the
context. He thus misunderstands the very nature of interpretation.
Professor McConnell also has a limited vision of the nature of judging. In that he is not alone: for at least several decades, scholars envisioned judging in constitutional cases as a rule-bound task, and have
50. Hirshman, supra note 44, at 200.
51. Wells, Means, Ends and Original Intent: A Response to Charles Cooper, 4 J.L. & POL. 81, 88
(1987) (attributing this motive to Cooper).
52. McConnell, supra note 1,at 106.
53. Id. at 94.
54. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
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searched for rules that will successfully constrain judges without leaving
legislatures free to ignore the Constitution. In light of the failure of these
"grand theories" to produce a useful and noncontroversial theory of constitutional constraints, many constitutional scholars have recently turned
instead to anti-formalist, anti-theoretical approaches. In articles too numerous to mention individually, these scholars have begun to suggest
that deciding constitutional cases requires what might be called judgment
or practical reason, and to describe the exercise of that faculty. Because
the literature is so extensive and impressive, I will describe it only very
briefly, ignoring the differences between different writers and focusing
55
instead on basic shared understandings.
Judging--especially in difficult constitutional cases-is not a
mechanical exercise, but a learned and lived craft. The tools of the trade
are a thoughtful life lived in American social and legal culture. A pragmatist finds no formula by which to decide the difficult questions, but
instead internalizes legal precedents, cultural traditions, moral values
and social consequences, creatively synthesizing them into the new patterns that best suit the question at hand. No single source will adequately address the hardest questions; answers to societal dilemmas must
be crafted from the web rather than constructed from the tower.
Above all, judging is an act of controlled creativity. Like writing at
its best, it both draws on and evokes memories of what has gone before,
but by innovation rather than by mimicry. It simultaneously acknowledges our debt to the past and denies that the past should control the
present. The task of the pragmatist decisionmaker is to reconcile a
flawed tradition with an imperfect world so as to improve both and do
damage to neither. We can argue about whether a particular judge does
so well or badly, but we should recognize that neither her job nor ours
can ever be mechanical.
The framers, in a century in which judges were expected merely to
55. See, e.g., Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987);
Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Farber & Frickey,
PracticalReason and the FirstAmendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1665 (1987); Fish, Dennis Martinez
and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider
Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 541
(1988); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987); Kronman, Alexander Bickel's
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Minow, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10
(1987); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
543 (1986); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983);
Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1982); Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on
Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (1986); West, Liberalism Rediscovered:A PragmaticDefinition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1985).
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discover the law, somehow foresaw both the temptation to view judging
as a mechanical act and the need to eschew that view. The ninth amendment was their safeguard.

